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I. INTRODUCTION
After a period of intense skepticism,1 intellectual property scholars
have once again embraced a theoretical kinship between property law
and intellectual property law. These scholars assert that property the-
ory has relevance for intellectual property theory, despite concerns
over the rhetorical power of denominating trademarks, copyrights,
and patent as property would potentially limit the ability of the intel-
lectual property goods to serve a range of political, social, or competi-
tive goals within a society.2 Intellectual property scholars, however,
have increasingly claimed that the doctrinal commitments of property
law not only offer a way to promote the interests of property holders,
but can also be used to address the ability to achieve the balance
sought between the property owner and the rights of impacted users.
For example, David Fagundes has asserted that clearly demarcated
copyright entitlements help to preserve the public domain by giving
users notice as to the limits of a granted right.3  Likewise, Madhavi
† Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. I would like to
thank Timothy Mulvaney and Peter Gerhart for the opportunity to participate in this
Symposium.  I would like to thank Ariel Dade for her research assistance.
1. See, e.g., Mark Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83
TEX. L. REV, 1031, 1032 (2005)  (the treatment of  “intellectual property” as “just
like” real property is a mistake ); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and
the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 SPG LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 33,
37(2003)  (“We are in the middle of a second enclosure movement. It sounds grandil-
oquent to call it ‘the enclosure of the intangible commons of the mind,’ but in a very
real sense that is just what it is. True, the new state-created property rights may be
‘intellectual’ rather than ‘real,’ but once again things that were formerly thought of as
either common property or uncommodifiable are being covered with new, or newly
extended, property rights.”).
2. See, e. .g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentive in Intellectual Property, 98
VA. L. REV. 1745 (2012) (arguing that copyright and patent in the United States are
founded on utilitarian notions of providing limited incentives to create socially valua-
ble works).
3. David Fagundes, Crystals in the Public Domain, 50 B.C. L. Rev 1, 16  (2009);
see also David Fagundes, Property Rhetoric and the Public Domain, 94 MINN. L. REV.
(2010) (arguing that the use of physical property rhetoric to suggest that public do-
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Sunder has contended that recovering the theoretical kinship between
property law and intellectual property law would help intellectual
property law to re-orient itself toward a normative plurality that
would stress  intellectual property’s ability to support social goods
such as the production of creative works, the formation of human as-
sociation, and the equal participation in property decision making.4
Ultimately, this scholarship is useful in its stress on one simple
claim: if we recognize that  intellectual property is after all, property,
this recognition does not automatically preclude judicial, legislative,
and administrative consideration of social, political, and competitive
harms that may arise from  individual intellectual property owners’
right to use, exclude, and transfer a patent, copyright, trade secret, or
trademark. In fact, this rich scholarship suggests that adopting the
framework of property law does not restrict us only to a reductive
debate over the scope of the intellectual property owners’ rights, but
permits the consideration of social, political, and competitive impacts
of designating certain information as intellectual property.
The subject of this symposium, Peter Gerhart’s masterful Property
and Social Morality,5 offers us another innovative way to contemplate
the relationship between property law and intellectual property law.
Property and Social Morality is an important work because of the cen-
trality that Gerhart places on the social obligation of the property
owner to act as a responsible decision maker as to the burdens and
benefits associated with property ownership in a relevant social con-
text.6  By articulating the importance of obligation as central to prop-
erty ownership, Gerhart helps us to articulate the source of limits that
can be placed on a property owner.  Thus, Gerhart considers, in his
words, what we owe each other, as central to a functional property
law. His work, therefore, offer us lessons on how to think usefully
about both the rights and responsibilities of the property owner in
different property categories.
This Essay explores how Gerhart’s theory of social obligation in
property law offers us an innovative way to characterize key theories
in patent law. Consequently, throughout this Essay, I employ lessons
from patent law that provide a concrete example of how obligations
may work in various doctrinal subjects.  Part I outlines the basic con-
tours of Gerhart’s theory of obligation.  Part II outlines the three basic
functions of obligation in property and intellectual property theory. It
is hoped that this Essay will serve a substantive function by continuing
main should be explicitly portrayed as a common property in order to suggest equal
responsibility of stewardship).
4. Madhavi Sunder, FROM GOODS TO A GOOD LIFE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND GLOBAL JUSTICE 8–10  (Yale Univ. Press 2012).
5. PETER M. GERHART, PROPERTY LAW AND SOCIAL MORALITY (Cambridge
Univ. Press 2014).
6. Id. at 61.
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the ongoing dialogue between property law and intellectual property
law in ways that fully account for the public interests that accrue in
both areas of the law.
II. OWNER OBLIGATION AND SOCIAL MORALITY
Peter Gerhart’s Property and Social Morality offers a unified frame-
work to resolve property conflicts between owners and competing so-
cial interests. Gerhart claims that property theory will achieve
coherence “by focusing on the values that shape a system of property
and that allowed the law to claim a system of moral action.”7 Ger-
hart’s unified framework, which he identifies as a theory of social mo-
rality, is based on four propositions.8
The first proposition is that the property owner acts as a con-
strained decision-maker; for Gerhart, the “essence of ownership is the
right to make decisions about a resource, but that the decisions are
constrained in their scope.”9 The second proposition is that the con-
straints placed on the property owner emerge from community norms
of recognition, what Gerhart terms the social recognition of property
ownership.10 Social recognition, suggests Gerhart, occurs “through
norms and laws, the interaction of the individuals shapes property
rights and responsibilities in ways that reflect values important to the
interacting individuals.”11  The third and fourth propositions offer
more precision to the content of the owner’s obligations to act appro-
priately within the relevant social context. The third proposition sug-
gests that the best method for determining the scope of the property
owner’s decision-making authority is to ensure that the property
owner engages in “other-regarding” decision-making that attends to
others’ wellbeing, in such a way, suggests the fourth proposition, that
accounts for “an appropriate assignment of the burdens and benefits
of their decisions, and that the assignment of burdens and benefits of
decisions must follow the requirements of equal freedom.”12
Broadly, Gerhart’s four propositions suggest that property law re-
flects a normative commitment to reciprocity.  Gerhart’s four proposi-
tions suggest collectively that the property owner’s decision-making
capacity, emerges from a dialogical exchange between the property
owner’s rights to use, exclude and transfer and the property owner’s
defined social obligations.  This normative commitment to reciprocity,
7. Id. at 4–5 (“By identifying a structured framework for organizing our thoughts
about the values used to resolve disparate interest and claims, we unify our under-
standing across what would otherwise appear to be large chasms of conflicting ideas,
while providing a structured basis for assessing the morality of the law.”).
8. Id. at x.
9. Id. at 73.
10. GERHART, supra note 5, at 46.
11. Id. at 73.
12. Id. at 110, 130–31.
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thus, acts to create meaning in the formal and informal dimensions of
property law.  Thus, Gerhart’s four propositions work together to
highlight a normative claim.  The property owner, in his or her deci-
sion-making capacity, enjoys the right to exclude, use and transfer, but
also has a corresponding obligation to exercise those rights in a man-
ner that is consistent with the relevant social context. Gerhart, there-
fore, makes visible what often remains invisible in property theory:
property regimes grant rights to property and impose duties on the
property owner.
Gerhart’s claim that the property owner’s obligations are central to
a functional property system is relevant to property and intellectual
property theory for two key reasons.  Initially, Gerhart’s claim ex-
pands how we conceive of duty within the context of property theory.
Duty is typically conceived in the property law system as a correlative
entitlement a third party owes to the property owner.  For example, in
Wesley Hohfeld’s theory of jural categorizations in property law if a
legal right exists in X in a property claim, then a duty is owed by Y not
to violate that right.13 Gerhart’s four propositions, however, suggest
an internalization of the obligations into the core of the property right
itself.  Thus, if a legal right exists in a property claim, then X owes Y a
duty in the exercise of that right.  While it appears that Gerhart’s the-
ory does not preclude the existence of a correlative right owed by Y,
Gerharts theory does, however, insist that X’s obligations are necessa-
rily relevant within any theoretical account.
Additionally, assessing the reciprocal obligations of the property
owner as a normative matter permits consideration of when limits
should be placed on the property owners’ actions. Reciprocal obliga-
tion supposes that two types of harm might arise from the property
owner’s behavior: harm as applied to a specific party and harm as ap-
plied to the shared values within the relevant property system.  Ini-
tially, assessing obligations may offer a simple way to understand
when the property owner has acted in a manner that is harmful to a
specific party. For example, in patent law, the doctrine of patent mis-
use permits recovery in those circumstances when the patent owner
has acted in a manner that is harmful to a specific party.  Recovery is
contemplated, therefore, when the patent owner has acted to exclude
products from the market that clearly do not infringe the relevant pat-
ent.  The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”)
13. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied
in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 32 (1913) (“In other words, if X has a right
against Y that he shall stay off the former’s land, the correlative (and equivalent) is
that Y is under a duty toward X to stay off the place.”). Shyamkrishna Balganesh, in
The Obligatory Structure of Copyright Law: Unbundling the Wrong of Copying (argu-
ing that copyright law reflects a standard correlative rights structure, which that sug-
gests that “copyright law is rightly understood as a system that imposes duties on
third-party”); Shyamkrishna Balganesh, in The Obligatory Structure of Copyright
Law: Unbundling the Wrong of Copying, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1664, 1668 (2012).
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in C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys.,14 distinguished between patent misuse
and related theories in antitrust law, thusly:
Patent misuse is viewed as a broader wrong than antitrust violation
because of the economic power that may be derived from the paten-
tee’s right to exclude. Thus misuse may arise when the conditions of
antitrust violation are not met. The key inquiry is whether, by impos-
ing conditions that derive their force from the patent, the patentee has
impermissibly broadened the scope of the patent grant with anticom-
petitive effect.15
This passage reveals that the harm contemplated by patent misuse
arises from a failure of reciprocal obligation insofar that the patent
owner has used the exclusive patent grant in a way that harms specific
competitors, thus violating the norm of reciprocity.  The granted right
is the right to exclude others from the ability to make, use, or sell the
patent; the obligation imposed is a duty not to use that exclusionary
right in a competitively, harmful manner.
Likewise, assessing obligation also permits an assessment when the
property owner’s actions harm the shared social values of a property
system.  In this sense, Gerhart’s recognition of shared social values is
consistent with a related project of Abraham Drassinower in copy-
right theory.16 Both theories suggest that the internalization of obliga-
tion reflects the moral relationship of the owner to the systematic
social concerns that animate the existence of the relevant property
claim and its resulting rights.
Once again, patent law offers useful examples that help to demon-
strate existing doctrinal obligations offer the ability to reflect shared
values.  For example, Section 112 of the Patent Act of 1952, as
amended by the America Invents Act of 2011, places affirmative17 cat-
14. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Systems, Inc., 157 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (emphasis
added).
15. Id.at 1372.
16. For instance, in discussing the relevance of the doctrine of originality within
the context of the rights enjoyed by the property owner, Drassinower notes that:
Copyright law posits the formation of the right it grants through the doctrine
of originality. Originality is a fundamental condition of copyright protection.
Because it presides over the formation of the right, originality cannot help
but demarcate the limits of the right. The doctrine of originality is thus in-
separable from a distinction between copying and actionable copying. “Not
all copying . . . is copyright infringement.” Only copying of the plaintiff’s
originality is actionable. Because the defendant’s duty not to copy is more
specifically a duty not to copy the plaintiff’s originality, the duty not to copy
arises only on the basis of distinctions between copyrightable and un-
copyrightable subject matter. The defendant’s duty not to copy is thus
neither the starting point nor the center of the copyright system. It is always
already posited on the basis of distinctions made elsewhere.
Abraham Drassinower, Copyright Is Not About Copying, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 108,
110–11 (2012).
17. Thus, in some respects, this affirmative set of obligations is stronger than inter-
nalized obligations, such as patent misuse discussed supra, as this affirmative obliga-
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egorical duties on patentees’ to disclose material information associ-
ated with the claimed invention. The disclosure requirements of
Section 112 impose four basic requirements associated with disclosure
including: (1) the requirement that the patent be enabled,18 (2) the
requirement  that the patent disclose the best mode,19 (3) the require-
ment that the patent disclose the contents of the invention fairly (com-
monly referred to as the written description requirement)20; (4) the
requirement  that the patent disclose the claims with specificity (com-
monly referred to as the claim definiteness requirement).21  As I dis-
cuss elsewhere22, these disclosure obligations impose on the patentee
ethical responsibilities “to speak clearly” and “to speak fairly” as to
disclosed invention.   This requirement, thus, reflects any number of
shared values associated with this patent system. These shared values
include the dissemination of information concerning discoveries and
inventions23, and the circulation of that information to a representa-
tive public that will rely on that information.24  The obligation to dis-
close, therefore, offers a way to discuss the shared values of the patent
system in information dissemination and information circulation.
III. THE FUNCTION OF OBLIGATION IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND PROPERTY LAW
Highlighting the property owner’s duty—-as equal to the property
owner’s right to exclude, use, and transfer—performs an important
function in property and intellectual property theory in three ways.
tion has been directly placed on the property owner through democratically
accountable actions.
18. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2006) (requiring the inventor to disclose information “in
such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to
which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the
same”).
19. Id. (requiring the inventor to “set forth the best mode contemplated by the
inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention”).
20. Id. (requiring that “the specification shall contain a written description of the
invention”).
21. Id. § 112(b) (requiring that “the specification shall conclude with one or more
claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the
inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention”).
22. KALI MURRAY, THE POLITICS OF PATENT LAW: CRAFTING THE PAR-
TICIPATORY PATENT BARGAIN 37–55 (2013) (assessing the role of ethical disclosure in
the morality of patent law).
23. Id. at 37 (citing Brenner v. Mason, 383 U.S. 519, 533 (1966) (“[O]ne of the
purposes of the patent system is to encourage dissemination of information concern-
ing discoveries and inventions.”).
24. Blanchard v. Sprague, 3 Sumn. 535 (1839) (Story, J.) (“Patents for inventions
are now treated as a just reward to ingenious men, and as highly beneficial to the
public, not only by holding out suitable encouragements to genius and talents-and
enterprise; but as ultimately securing to the whole community great advantages from
the free communication of secrets, and processes, and machinery, which may be most
important to all the great interests of society, to agriculture, to commerce and to
manufactures, as well as to the cause of science and art.”).
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Initially, Gerhart’s theory has specific resonance for patent law be-
cause of its insistence that the property owner is a relevant moral ac-
tor.  Patent law has often had an incoherent approach to questions of
its potential moral commitments, due to the specific use of product-
specific morality in patent law. Product-specific morality occurs when
the courts attempt to determine whether a potential invention should
be considered to be protected subject-matter based solely on the con-
tent embodied in potential invention.  For example, in Juicy Whip,
Inc., v. Orange Bang Inc.,25 which rejected the application of the com-
mon-law moral utility doctrine under the Patent Act of 1952, the Fed-
eral Circuit adhered rigidly to an inquiry whether the patent itself was
moral.26 The majority opinion authored by Judge Bryson emphasized
that the utility requirement of Section 101 was satisfied when “one
product can be altered to make it look like another”  despite decep-
tive effects, this imitation has “utility” within the meaning of the pat-
ent statute, because “much of the value of such products resides in the
fact that they appear to be something they are not.”27 Juicy Whip ex-
emplifies how the treatment of an invention in isolation absolves legal
decision-makers from contemplation of any ethical or moral chal-
lenges that may accompany a further determination. Indeed, Judge
Bryson in Juicy Whip further emphasizes that other agencies besides
the primary patent agency would be responsible for assessing the de-
ceptive effects of patents.28
Product-specific morality is useful for judicial, administrative, and
legal decision makers   because of the doctrine’s apparent neutrality.
Product-specific morality with its apparent neutrality may permit the
decision-maker to mask, or even avoid the potential moral conse-
quences associated with the granted patent. Product-specific morality,
then, is a compromised vehicle for consideration of plural values that
might be embodied within the grant of a patent, and at least in the
United States, may explain the incoherence of the associated legal
doctrines.  Product-specific morality creates significant indeterminacy
in exactly why a patent should not be granted in a given invention as
the analysis fails to place a relevant inquiry into a contextual analysis
of the social relations that produce the invention and provide for its
use once granted.
Gerhart’s theory of obligation suggests that while patent law does
not need to replace product-specific morality, patent law also adopts
another kind of morality, actor-specific morality.  Actor-specific mo-
rality, at its core, recognizes that the patent owner’s actions can also
impact social relations between the inventor and respective scientific
community, or between the inventor and subsequent use.  Recogniz-
25. Juicy Whip v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
26. Id. at 1367–68.
27. Id. at 1367.
28. Id. at 1368.
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ing actor-specific morality involves examining the relations of the in-
ventor to the given inventive community and to the potential users in
context.
Thus, adopting legal doctrines that analyze actor-specific morality
in patent law permits a more complex view of the patent’s moral sta-
tus and the subsequent regulation of the patent. Figure 1 depicts how
to perceive of the actor-specific analysis and product-specific morality
in patent law.
As demonstrated by Figure 1, the doctrinal recognition of the moral
content of patent law focuses on whether the inventor’s actions are
moral and whether the invention itself is moral.  In some sense, this
analysis already occurs in patent law.  For instance, the doctrine of
inequitable conduct is focused on whether the inventor properly dis-
closed information to the United States Patent and Trademark Of-
fice.29  In this analysis, a court could come to perceive morality within
a multi-faceted analysis.  This multi-faceted analysis could attempt to
capture the moral and ethical obligations the inventor has with the
object of invention, the particular scientific, technical or research com-
munity that seeks to use the material, and the subsequent users of the
respective patent.  Such an approach is consistent with Gerhart’s claim
that property systems need to engage with and reflect the shared val-
ues of a given community.
Additionally, by emphasizing obligation as a central coordinating
norm in property theory, Gerhart’s theory of social morality empha-
sizes that property law and its institutions operates through fluid, con-
tinual interactions between the property owner and a shared social
context.  By emphasizing the rights of the property owner in exclusion
to all else suggests that property relationships as static insofar as the
property owner enjoys settled rights within a given and well-under-
29. Kali Murray & Dmitry Vinarov, Rethinking Patent Fraud Enforcement in A
Reform Era, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 264 (2009) (assessing standards of
materiality).
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stood property regime. Assessing the legal duties that flow from obli-
gations, however, offers a convenient way to reflect this dynamic
interaction between the property owner and the demands of the rele-
vant social context. Gerhart’s theory, consequently, is supportive of
recent work in property theory that suggests the dynamic nature of
property law formation.30 Specifically, Gerhart’s emphasis on interac-
tivity as a dominant property characteristic is resonant with the claim
of authors such as Donald Kochan suggests that property law needs to
more actively map the ways in which different actors in property sys-
tems situate themselves in a range of decision-making informal, nego-
tiated and formal dimensions.31
Theories that reflect obligation, thus, are uniquely representative of
dynamic interaction between the property owner and the shared social
context.  The imposition on obligation may offer a doctrinal response
to when disputes emerge over how a property resource is used.  Else-
where,32 I have traced how common-law obligation theory in both
contracts and property law informed the emergence in constitutional
patent law of a key constitutional principle: the patent bargain, which
is33 the idea that “the federal patent system thus embodies a carefully
crafted bargain for encouraging the creation and disclosure of new,
useful, and nonobvious advances in technology and design in return
for the exclusive right to practice the invention for a period of
years.”34  As I have discussed infra, the existence of the patent bargain
reflects how legal doctrines can reflect how a property right can inter-
nalize the corresponding rights of the property owner.  In this in-
stance, the patent right internalizes the corresponding obligation of
the patent owner to disclose information that is generated by the
invention.
The constitutional patent bargain emerged over time and reflects
how doctrines that express reciprocal effect dynamic interaction be-
tween the property owner and the shared social context in two ways.
Doctrines that embody obligation exemplify the dynamic interaction
help to legitimate property systems as political systems.  Obligation
doctrines suggest that property systems are contingent and can change
over time in response to social, political and individual pressures.  The
contingent nature of property systems often legitimizes property law
generally, because it suggests to regulated constituencies that harms to
shared values can be addressed.  Second, obligation doctrines can spe-
cifically serve as a vehicle for contingent change.  For example, patent
30. Donald J. Kochan, A Framework for Understanding Property Regulation and
Land Use Control from a Dynamic Perspective, 4 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN.
L. (forthcoming 2015).
31. Id. at 4.
32. Kali Murray, Constitutional Patent Law: Principles and Institutions, 93 NE-
BRASKA L. REV. (forthcoming June 2015).
33. Id.
34. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150–51 (1989).
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law experienced such a dynamic re-ordering in the late nineteenth
century.  Social and innovative disruption as to how patents were be-
ing used, prompted judicial and legislative imposition of new forms of
obligations onto patent owners through a re-constituted patent bar-
gain.  Thus, the metaphor of the patent bargain became a doctrinal
vehicle to manage disruptions within the patent system.
Finally, another goal—what I term specificity—is achieved by fo-
cusing on doctrines related to obligation in property and intellectual
property theory.  Recent property theory, exemplified in scholarship
grounded in progressive property theory, has emphasized that prop-
erty ownership needs to be situated in an awareness of the plural val-
ues served by property systems.35  A claim, however, that “human
values” ought to trump the specific property rights enjoyed by the
property owner is not instinctually persuasive.  Claims to broad
“human values” are diffuse as opposed to the more concrete claims of
ownership. One method to achieve is specificity, is to focus on individ-
ual cases or narratives that dramatically depict those human values.
This narrative structure seeks to provide ways of understanding plural
values in property law.  But addressing human values, through cases
or other narrative, does not enjoy the same categorical force as the
claims accorded to the property rights enjoyed by a property owner.
Imposing obligations, however, on the property owner’s decision
making is a much more concrete expression of what a given property
system deems important to its ultimate function.  For example, in pat-
ent law, the disclosure obligation imposed on patent holders owners
suggest key values of the patent system, including  the open dissemi-
nation and circulation of information within a given property commu-
nity.  Indeed, the disclosure obligation in patent law also embodies
parties that would be most harmed by the failure to uphold those obli-
gations, the public who would most likely use the patent and the pub-
lic whose previous work is represented in the granted patent.
Consequently, obligation doctrine serves an important function in
making specific claims as to the types of harms that may arise from
how an owner engages in their decision-making power as to a given
property item.  Thus, the normative claims of obligation perform an
important role in shaping public discourse of over the content of the
property right within a particular regime.
35. Gregory S. Alexander et. al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 COR-
NELL L. REV. 743 (2009) (“Property implicates plural and incommensurable val-
ues. . ..Some of these values promote individual interests, wants, needs, desires, and
preferences. Some promote social interests, such as environmental stewardship, civic
responsibility, and aggregate wealth. Others govern human interaction to ensure that
people relate to each other with respect and dignity.”).
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IV. CONCLUSION
  Much more could be said about Peter Gerhart’s work in Property
and Social Morality.  It is important, however, that we focus on his
singular achievement in this text.  He makes the obligation the center
of how we perceive the rights of the property owner.  He also makes
visible how these rights function within a shared social context.  Such
insight will be the subject of more fruitful conversations in the future.
